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Corporate Liability: Enforcing Human
Rights Through Domestic Litigation
BY BETH STEPHENS*
Introduction
As highly efficient economic entities, corporations are capable of
generating vital economic development-but they also have the
potential for inflicting devastating human rights abuses. There is
tremendous profit to be made from abusive behavior, and in the
absence of effective regulation, corporations often seek to maximize
profit at the expense of basic rights.
The spread of economic globalization has triggered international
calls to develop mechanisms to hold transnational corporations
responsible for their conduct. But such entities are inherently
difficult regulatory targets, with enormous economic and political
strength and the ability to move assets and operations around the
world. Our largely domestic legal systems are inadequate to deal with
enterprises that operate on a global scale. It is difficult to conceive of
effective regulation of these actors without either strengthened
international oversight or coordinated domestic efforts. In the
meantime, domestic litigation against corporations is one piece of the
worldwide struggle to force the global economy to respect human
rights.
I. Corporate Accountability
Efforts to increase transnational accountability focus both on
developing legal norms that bind corporations and on identifying
legal structures with the power to enforce such norms. On the
international level, one combined approach utilizes treaty-based
* Associate Professor, Rutgers University School of Law at Camden. Professor
Stephens has worked on many of the human rights cases discussed in this article, as
counsel, amicus or consultant.
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regimes: international agreements set standards for corporate
behavior in areas such as pollution and corruption, and require
individual states to enforce compliance.' In a parallel effort, the
United Nations Human Rights Commission has drafted basic norms
governing corporate human rights behavior; if adopted, compliance
would be monitored through the United Nations system. Voluntary
codes of conduct have also proliferated over the past few years,
developed by the United Nations as well as by many individual
corporations. These voluntary efforts, however, have been widely
criticized for their failure to provide for enforcement.
Domestic efforts to regulate corporate behavior must first
address a central aspect of the enforcement conundrum, the question
of whether the legal regime of the home country-the site of
incorporation-or of the host country-the site of the activities at
issue-should govern. At first blush, it seems obvious that the
country where events take place should have the final say as to what
activities it will or will not permit within its borders. The United
States, for example, dictates rules of behavior for all operations
within our borders. The reality around the world, however, is that
home countries usually do not have the power to regulate
multinational enterprises. Unequal bargaining power leads to
supremely unfair investment conditions. Moreover, multinational
businesses, protected by carefully designed corporate structures, can
often insulate themselves from liability in any one host country. Such
entities easily take advantage of differences among legal systems,
transferring operations and assets to the most favorable location-
often the place where they are least likely to be held accountable. In
the 1970s and 1980s, the underdeveloped and socialist countries
sought to impose their host country rules on corporations doing
business in their territory. These efforts included a movement in the
United Nations to develop codes of corporate conduct that would
have required respect for local priorities and laws and reinvestment of
profits in the host countries. With the triumph of the global economy,
most such host country efforts have collapsed.
Regulation by the home country thus may be a more practical
1. See, e.g., Convention on Civil Liability for Damage Resulting from Activities
Dangerous to the Environment, June 21, 1993, arts. 6, 7, 32 I.L.M. 1228, 1233-34
(operator of polluting facility or waste dump liable for damage); International
Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollution Damage, Nov. 29, 1969, art. III, 973
U.N.T.S. 4, 5 ("[T]he owner of a ship.., shall be liable for any pollution damage
caused by oil .... ).
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option. This can involve both norm enunciation and enforcement
mechanisms. A detailed set of environmental, labor and human
rights standards was introduced into the U.S. Congress last year.' The
standards would have applied to all U.S. corporations accepting
assistance from a number of important government programs;
violators would have been denied access to this crucial public support.
International norms can also be enforced through litigation, as
discussed in the following sections. Such home country enforcement
efforts raise sensitive issues of imposing foreign standards on weaker
nations. Governments of some third world countries resent western
efforts to impose higher labor and environmental standards, arguing
that such regulations will cost them jobs. Activists in some of these
nations reject their governments' views, however, arguing that their
political leaders respond to the pressure of international business
interests, not the interests of their own citizens.
Indeed, transnational corporations have become so proficient at
protecting assets through complex corporate structures, and at
dominating the political and legal systems of the impoverished states
in which they do business, that the 1990s have seen several such states
asking for access to home State courts to enforce the rights of their
citizens. For example, the South African government joined South
African plaintiffs in asking English courts to resolve a claim against
an English company for damages inflicted on workers at its South
African plant. The government of Ecuador took varying positions as
to litigation against Texaco for environmental damage, eventually
asking the U.S. federal court to decide the case.4 In the words of one
Ecuadoran legislator, litigation against Texaco in the United States
represented the only possibility of "finding just treatment" for those
injured by the oil company's operations.5
H. Domestic Litigation: Negligence Claims
Domestic litigation must allege claims cognizable in the
2. The Transparency and Responsibility for U.S. Trade Health Act of 2001,
H.R. Res. 460,107th Cong. (2001) (introduced by Rep. Cynthia McKinney).
3. See Statement of Case on Behalf of the Republic of South Africa (May 26,
2000), Lubbe v. Cape PLC, 1 W.L.R. 1545 (2000) (appeal taken from Eng. C.A.)
(arguing that consideration of "public interest" weighed in favor of deciding the case
in England, not in South Africa) (on file with author).
4. See Jota v. Texaco, Inc., 157 F.3d 153, 156-58 (2d Cir. 1998) (discussing the
various Ecuadoran government submissions).
5. Id. at 157.
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particular court system, and must target defendants subject to the
personal jurisdiction of those courts. Suits have been filed in several
common law legal systems against domestic corporations based on
environmental and negligence claims. Such actions have been
brought in England, Canada and Australia, asserting negligence
claims arising out of corporate activities in foreign countries, where
the firm is incorporated in the forum state.6
Such claims are possible only when they fall within recognized
causes of action such as negligence. Most legal systems will apply the
law of the place where the events took place, and local laws designed
to insulate repressive regimes may make it difficult to pursue cases
based on human rights claims. Such claims are impossible, for
example, when a national legal system does not recognize as a tort a
human rights violation such as a summary execution committed by a
police officer or torture in the course of interrogations. Moreover,
although such domestic claims may serve as partial "surrogates" for
international human rights claims, they risk losing the moral
blameworthiness inherent in the formal categories of international
human rights law. As noted by one U.S. judge, an international
human rights violation should not be reduced "to no more (or less)
than a garden-variety municipal tort.",
7
I1. Domestic Litigation in U.S. Courts: Human Rights Claims
In the United States, a unique statute, the Alien Tort Claims
Act,' permits suits based directly on violations of international law.
The statute grants the federal courts jurisdiction over a "civil action
by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States." 9 The statute was originally
enacted as part of the First Judiciary Act in 1789. The founders of the
new nation were concerned about the international repercussions of
several incidents in which the states failed to provide redress to
6. See Richard Meeran, Accountability of Transnationals for Human Rights
Abuses, 148 NEW L.J. 1686 (1998) & 148 NEW L.J. 1706 (1998). The House of Lords
recently rejected an effort to dismiss a series of cases in favor of a forum in South
Africa. Lubbe, 1 W.L.R. 1545.
7. Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 183 (D. Mass. 1995). Judge Woodlock
continued: "This is not merely a question of formalism or even of the amount or type
of damages available: rather it concerns the proper characterization of the kind of
wrongs .... In this light, municipal tort law is an inadequate placeholder for such
values." Id.
8. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994).
9. Id.
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individuals harmed by violations of international law." The statute
ensured that the federal government could offer relief in such
situations, by authorizing civil suits in federal courts by aggrieved
aliens. Although cited in an early opinion by the U.S. Attorney
General," the statute was largely ignored until the Second Circuit
decided the Fildrtiga case in 1980.12 In Fildrtiga, the family of a young
Paraguayan man who was tortured to death in Paraguay filed a
lawsuit against a Paraguayan police officer. The district court
dismissed the case, holding that the torture by a state official of that
state's own citizen did not violate international law. 3 The Second
Circuit disagreed, however, holding that the statute addresses
violations of the law of nations as that body of law evolves over time,
and concluding that torture by a state of its own citizens violated
modern norms of international law. 4
Fildrtiga has been followed by every circuit and district court to
reach a decision on the issue.15 The statute has been consistently
interpreted as applying to acts that violate "universal, obligatory and
definable" norms. 6 Thus courts have found that human rights and
humanitarian law violations such as genocide, summary execution,
10. See Beth Stephens, Federalism and Foreign Affairs: Congress's Power to
"Define and Punish... Offenses Against the Law of Nations," 42 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 447, 490-91,520-24 (2000) (discussing history of ATCA).
11. 1 Op. Att'y Gen. 57 (1795) (suggesting, in response to complaint that U.S.
citizens had attacked a British colony in Sierra Leone, that those injured file civil suit
for damages under ATCA).
12. Fildrtiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980).
13. See id. at 880 (summarizing district court decision).
14. Id. at 881,884-85.
15. See, e.g., Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88 (2d Cir. 2000), cert.
denied, 121 S. Ct. 1402 (2001); Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 197 F.3d 161 (5th
Cir. 1999); Martinez v. City of Los Angeles, 141 F.3d 1373 (9th Cir. 1998); Hilao v.
Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 789 (9th Cir. 1996); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir.
1995), cert. denied, 518 U.S. 1005 (1996); Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d 844 (11th
Cir.), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 830 (1996). In one decision by the D.C. Circuit, a three-
judge panel rejected an ATCA claim without reaching agreement on the significance
of the statute. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985). One judge disagreed with the Fildrtiga holding, id. at
798-823 (Bork, J., concurring), while one agreed with it, id. at 775-98 (Edwards, J.,
concurring), and one would have dismissed the case on the basis of the political
question doctrine, id. at 823-27 (Robb, J., concurring).
16. First articulated in Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1539-40 (N.D.
Cal. 1987), this standard has since been widely accepted. See, e.g., Martinez, 141 F.3d
1373; In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir.
1994); BETH STEPHENS & MICHAEL RATNER, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS
LITIGATION IN U.S. COURTS 51-52 (1995).
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war crimes and crimes against humanity, disappearance, slavery and
forced labor trigger jurisdiction under the ATCA" Claims have
been rejected where the courts find no universal consensus as to the
prohibition, including claims against private corporations for
environmental harm, and claims based on expropriation of property,
state contract law, fraud and free speech violations. 8
Post-Fildrtiga cases have recognized additional categories of
defendants who can be held liable under the ATCA. Fildrtiga held
liable the actual torturer. Defendants in several subsequent cases
have included military commanders held responsible for violations
committed by troops under their command. Philippine dictator
Ferdinand Marcos, for example, was held responsible for thousands
of executions, disappearances and torture committed by his military
forces. 9
While all cases prior to 1995 considered violations committed by
officials of recognized states, the Second Circuit decision in Kadic v.
Karadzic° addressed for the first time the responsibility of nonstate
actors. Kadic involved claims of gross human rights abuses, including
genocide, torture and war crimes, against Radovan Karadzic, the
head of the unrecognized Bosnian Serb regime. The regime was in de
facto control of large segments of Bosnia, but was not a recognized
17. See, e.g., Estate of Marcos, 25 F.3d at 1475-76 (summary execution, torture,
disappearance); Kadic, 70 F.3d at 246 (genocide, war crimes, and crimes against
humanity); Abebe-Jira, 72 F.3d at 845 (torture); Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 963 F. Supp.
880, 891-92 (C.D. Cal. 1997) (slavery and forced labor).
18. See, e.g., Beanal, 197 F.3d 161 (rejecting environmental claim against
corporation); Bigio v. Coca Cola Co., 239 F.3d 440, 447-50 (2d Cir. 2000) (rejecting
ATCA jurisdiction over claim that defendant acquired property that had previously
been expropriated by Egyptian government on basis of the owners' religion); Nat'l
Coalition Gov't of the Union of Burma v. Unocal, Inc., 176 F.R.D. 329, 345 (C.D.
Cal. 1997) (dismissing ATCA claim for loss of property); Wong-Opasi v. Tenn. State
Univ., 2000 WL 1182827, at *2 (6th Cir. Aug. 16, 2000) (unpublished disposition)
(rejecting ATCA jurisdiction over state law contract and tort claims); Hamid v. Price
Waterhouse, 51 F.3d 1411, 1417-18 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that claims of fraud,
breach of fiduciary duty, and misappropriation of funds are not breaches of the "law
of nations" for purposes of jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Statute); Guinto v.
Marcos, 654 F. Supp. 276, 280 (S.D. Cal. 1986) ("violation of the First Amendment
right of free speech does not rise to the level of such universally recognized rights and
so does not constitute a 'law of nations"').
19. Estate of Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467. See also, e.g., Kadic, 70 F.3d 232 (leader of the
Bosnian Serbs held responsible for violations committed by troops); Xuncax v.
Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162 (D. Mass. 1995) (military commander held responsible for
violations committed by troops); Paul v. Avril, 812 F. Supp. 207 (S.D. Fla. 1993)
(same); Forti, 672 F. Supp. 1531 (same).
20. 70 F.3d 232.
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state. Noting that international law determines who can be held
liable under the ATCA, the court held first that the international
prohibitions against genocide and certain war crimes apply to all
actors, including private citizens.2' Second, the court found that
although certain international law norms govern only official action,
these norms also apply to private actors who act "in concert with" a
state.2
These two principles permit the application of the ATCA to
corporate defendants. Private corporations are liable for violations of
human rights norms such as genocide, slavery and war crimes that by
definition apply to private actors as well as official government
agents. Moreover, corporations can be held liable for violations
committed "in concert with" government officials. This principle of
private corporate liability under the ATCA has been upheld in a
handful of preliminary decisions, although some have been dismissed
on other grounds and none has yet resulted in a final judgment. In
Doe I v. Unocal Corp.,n for example, the district court found that a
corporation can be held liable for private acts of slavery and forced
labor because the international law prohibitions apply to all actors.
Similarly, in Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan,24 the district court found
that a private corporation can be held liable for genocide, which by
definition is barred whether committed by "public officials or private
individuals."''
These decisions have also recognized that corporations can be
held responsible under the ATCA for international law violations
that require state action, such as torture and summary executions. As
stated by the court in Beanal, "[A] corporation found to be a state
21. Id. at 241-43.
22. Id. at 245. Plaintiffs alleged that Karadzic acted in concert with the
recognized government of the former Yugoslavia. The Second Circuit also held that
the official action requirement is satisfied by officials of a de facto regime, noting that
state action does not turn on formal recognition, but requires "merely the semblance
of official authority." Id.
23. 963 F. Supp. 880, 891-92 (C.D. Cal. 1997), dismissed on motion for summary
judgment, 110 F. Supp. 2d 1294 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (appeal pending).
24. Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362, 372-73 (E.D. La. 1997).
In Beanal, however, the district court dismissed plaintiffs third amended complaint,
holding that even as amended, it still did not adequately allege genocide. Beanal v.
Freeport-McMoran, Inc., 1998 WL 92246 (E.D. La. March 3, 1998) (unpublished
opinion), affd, 197 F.3d 161 (5th Cir. 1999).
25. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
Dec. 9, 1948, art. 4, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force for the United
States Feb. 23, 1989).
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actor can be held responsible for human rights abuses which violate
international customary law."26 State action will be found when the
private corporation acts in complicity with state actors; the courts
apply the well developed standards of domestic civil rights cases to
determine complicity."
IV. The Peculiarities of Domestic Legal Systems
Each domestic legal system has its own peculiarities, with
variations in the basic definitions of legal claims as well as rules of
jurisdiction and procedures. As a result, civil human rights claims
under the Fildrtiga model are peculiar to the U.S. legal system. In
other countries, efforts to hold individuals and corporations liable for
both private and official misconduct proceed along different legal
tracks." The line between civil and criminal actions, for example,
varies widely. Many civil law systems permit private parties to initiate
criminal prosecutions; in such systems, an individual harmed by a
human rights violation would be more likely to file a criminal charge
than a civil lawsuit. In the United States, criminal prosecutions can
only be initiated by the government; despite a federal statute
authorizing prosecutions for torture committed anywhere in the
world, there have been no criminal prosecutions.29
On the other hand, civil litigation for human rights violations is
decidedly more attractive in the United States in part because the
Alien Tort Claims Act permits suits for violations of international
law. International law, which is binding on all states, defines the
claim. Thus, torture is actionable even if the laws of a repressive
26. Beanal, 969 F. Supp. at 376.
27. See, e.g., Kadic, 70 F.3d at 245; Beanal, 969 F. Supp. at 374-80; Unocal, 963 F.
Supp. at 890-91.
28. The comparative analysis in this section is developed more fully in Beth
Stephens, Translating Fildrtiga: A Comparative and International Law Analysis Of
Domestic Remedies For International Human Rights Violations, 27 YALE J. INT'L L.
- (forthcoming Winter 2002).
29. 18 U.S.C. § 2340A (1994) (imposing penalties for "[w]hoever outside the
United States commits or attempts to commit torture."). The U.S. government has
refused to initiate prosecutions despite efforts by human rights groups to gather
information on potential criminal defendants present in the United States. Beth Van
Schaack, In Defense of Civil Redress: The Domestic Enforcement of Human Rights
Norms in the Context of the Proposed Hague Judgments Convention, 42 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 141, 148-49 & n.38 (2001) (citing Interview with Gerald Gray, Executive
Director, The Center for Justice & Accountability, in San Francisco, Cal. (June 5,
2000)). See also Coletta A. Youngers, The Pinochet Ricochet, NATION, May 8, 2000,
at 5, 6 (discussing U.S. government refusal to initiate torture prosecution).
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nation permit it. Similarly, forced labor is an international law
violation even if a local legal system permits slavery or other
internationally forbidden labor practices.
No other country has a statute that creates a specific statutory
claim for human rights violations. Of course, as in the United States,
such claims can also be brought under other civil provisions. Torture
constitutes assault and battery; summary execution constitutes
wrongful death. But the parallels may be incomplete, and, as noted
above, the standard tort claims may pose barriers to human rights
litigation. For example, in some systems, a wrongful death claim may
not be possible where the military is responsible for the killing.
Repressive legal regimes may permit forced labor. Individuals may be
excused from responsibility for their actions, no matter how heinous,
if they act under official orders. The U.S. willingness to impose
international standards of behavior deprives human rights violators of
the ability to shelter behind the repressive laws of abusive
governments.
In addition, international human rights litigation is possible in
the United States because of several mundane U.S. principles and
practices. To begin, U.S. rules of personal jurisdiction permit
litigation against individuals who are temporarily present in the
United States, if they are served with a lawsuit during their stay.
Thus, the federal courts were able to assert personal jurisdiction over
Radovan Karadzic, who was served while in New York City on a
temporary stay.3° Foreign corporations are subject to suit when doing
business in the United States, even if such contacts are a small part of
their worldwide operations. As a result, U.S. courts upheld personal
jurisdiction over Royal Dutch Petroleum Company and Shell
Transport and Trading Company, two foreign corporations, based
largely on the operations of their investor relations offices in New
York.
31
Once general personal jurisdiction has been asserted, the U.S.
system does not require a finding of a connection between the events
at issue and the United States. Thus, the Shell parent companies can
be sued in federal court in New York for acts that took place in
Nigeria. U.S. courts may dismiss human rights cases on the basis of
30. Kadic, 70 F.3d at 247. The Kadic court relied on FED. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(2),
which authorizes service of process upon a person physically present in a judicial
district, and Burnham v. Superior Court of California, 495 U.S. 604 (1990), which
found personal jurisdiction based upon such service to be constitutional.
31. Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 226 F.3d 88, 94-99 (2d Cir. 2000).
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forum non conveniens, if another forum is considered more
appropriate. In the Wiwa decision, however, the Second Circuit
indicated that the U.S. policy favoring international human rights
accountability weighs against such dismissals, given that such suits
cannot be brought as human rights claims in other countries. 2
Many legal systems do not recognize transient jurisdiction over
individual defendants, or "doing business" jurisdiction over
corporations. International agreements focus on the domicile of the
individual defendant, the place of incorporation of a corporate
defendant, or the location of the incidents at issue in the litigation.
These are the basic rules adopted by most of the countries of Europe
in the Brussels Convention,3 and the basis for an international
convention currently under negotiation.' Under these rules, unless a
defendant is sued at home, a claim can only proceed if key events
took place in the forum state.35
Most domestic legal systems, in fact, also recognize additional
grounds of jurisdiction, rules that would seem exorbitant to U.S.
lawyers today. For example, several countries permit suit against an
individual whose property is present in the locale-a rule known
dismissively as the "Swedish umbrella rule"-that is, don't leave your
umbrella in Sweden, or you may find yourself subject to suit in
Swedish courts for any and all claims.36 Similarly, French citizens may
bring suit in French courts for any claim, against any defendant.37
32. Id. at 103-06.
33. Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and
Commercial Matters, Sept. 27, 1968, arts. 2 (domicile of individual or corporation),
5(3) (place of events at issue), 1990 O.J. (C 189) 1 (as amended), reprinted in 29
I.L.M. 1413 [hereinafter Brussels Convention].
34. See generally Van Schaack, supra note 29 (discussing the proposed
Convention on Jurisdiction and Foreign Judgments in Civil and Commercial
Matters).
35. An important exception is provided for suits against co-defendants. Brussels
Convention, supra note 33, arts. 6(1), 6(2). Thus, if one defendant is subject to suit in
a forum, jurisdiction can be asserted against all joint tortfeasors. This rule is broader
than those in place in the United States, and avoids the difficulties faced by U.S.
plaintiffs who cannot find a single jurisdiction in which all co-defendants can be
brought to court in a single lawsuit.
36. "The danger of leaving one's umbrella in Sweden is known the world over.
For if a non-resident leaves his umbrella in Sweden, he creates the authority for a
Swedish court to cast him in a personal judgment for a debt obligation in any
amount." Hans Smit, Common and Civil Law Rules of In Personam Adjudicatory
Authority: An Analysis of Underlying Policies, 21 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 335, 335
(1972).
37. Articles 14 and 15 of the French Civil Code assert French jurisdiction over
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U.S. jurisdiction rules are not more expansive than those in other
legal systems-but they happen to function in a manner that permits
civil human rights litigation by aliens for events that took place in
another country to proceed more easily than in other systems.
Additionally, practical litigation rules may be just as important in
rendering civil human rights litigation attractive in the United
States-and difficult if not impossible in other countries. Perhaps
most important, most legal systems follow the "loser pays" system of
attorney fees: the losing party must pay the legal fees of the winner.'
This system has a devastating impact on novel legal claims,
particularly when litigated by plaintiffs with minimal resources. None
of the U.S. human rights plaintiffs could have risked filing their claims
if they had faced the possibility of paying the legal fees of the
defendants.
The legal costs of the plaintiffs themselves pose a significant
barrier in many countries. In some systems, steep filing fees must be
paid to the court before initiating litigation. In others, legal fees to
one's own attorney must be pre-paid. Moreover, costly public
interest litigation is possible in the United States because of a broad
network of public interest law firms, supported by pro bono
assistance from private firms. Such networks simply do not exist in
most of the world. In addition, where collection of judgments is
possible, contingency fees in the United States permit private firms to
finance litigation, viewing the payment of expenses as an investment
likely to reap huge profits if a human rights case is successful. In the
litigation against the Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, for example, a
private law firm representing the class of thousands of victims of
abuses sought a contingency fee that may be over $34 million.39
Finally, well-known features of the U.S. legal system contribute
any suit brought by a French national or brought against a French national.
38. JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN ET AL., THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION: EUROPE,
LATIN AMERICA, AND EAST ASIA 599, 1026 (1994) ("In most of Europe and Latin
America, and much of the rest of the world, including England and Canada, the rule
is that the loser pays the winner's attorney fees.... ."). One commentator cites "loser
pays" as the "[f]irst and most important[]" obstacle to human rights litigation in
English courts. Michael Byers, English Courts and Serious Human Rights Violations
Abroad: A Preliminary Assessment, in LIABILITY OF MULTINATIONAL
CORPORATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 241, 244 (Menno T. Kamminga &
Saman Zia-Zarifi eds., 2000).
39. Teddy Casino, Fast Forward: Poorer But Richer, BUSINESS WORLD, Aug. 6,
1999. The huge proposed fee aroused fierce protests from some members of the class.
Id. (quoting some class members as describing a proposal to award the class $150
million, with over $34 million in contingency fees to the legal team, as "nauseating").
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to the feasibility of initiating litigation. The notice pleading system
permits plaintiffs to file claims with bare bones allegations, without
providing all of the details of the underlying facts.' Liberal discovery
can then be used to flesh out the claims-with the defendants
obligated to furnish all relevant information in their control.4 Thus, a
civil case can be filed based upon a reasonable belief in the
allegations of the complaint, with the expectation that proof sufficient
to convince a jury can be obtained in the course of discovery. 2
These peculiarities of the U.S. legal system are both cause and
effect of significant cultural differences in the way in which litigation
is viewed by different societies. Many societies view the regulation of
corporate behavior and the punishment of criminal behavior as the
role of the government, not private citizens. Thus, French victims of
a human rights violation might view regulation of the behavior of
French corporations abroad as the job of the government, rather than
an issue to be addressed through litigation. Reformers and activists
would therefore concentrate their efforts on pressuring the
government to change its policies, rather than filing a lawsuit."
Moreover, human rights victims might view private civil litigation
as an inappropriate response to the abuses they suffered, even as a
trivialization of the grossly criminal abuses inflicted on them. "The
civil process is conceived in terms of private, individualistic
situations," while "[t]he criminal process effectuates the public
interest... ."' Thus, the French would be less likely to utilize the
tort suit as a means of making a symbolic statement, or as a means of
punishing the defendant 5  Indeed, in most legal systems, civil
remedies are purely compensatory, with punitive damages permitted
40. The federal rules require only a "short and plain statement of the claim
showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a), a requirement that
allows a case to proceed based upon skeletal allegations of the key facts.
41. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26 (setting forth scope of permissible discovery in federal
litigation).
42. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11(b) (requiring that attorney certify that claims are, "to
the best of that person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry
reasonable under the circumstances").
43. See Mauro Cappelletti, Governmental and Private Advocates for the Public
Interest in Civil Litigation: A Comparative Study, 73 MICH. L. REv. 793, 878 n.380
(1975) (explaining the lesser rate of public interest litigation in civil law systems as
resulting, in part, from "a different conception of the respective roles of legislation
and adjudication in the law-making process").
44. Richard B. Cappalli & Claudio Consolo, Class Actions for Continental
Europe? A Preliminary Inquiry, 6 TEMP. INT'L & CoMp. L.J. 217,269-70 (1992).
45. Id.
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only in a handful of systems outside of the United States. Most legal
systems view criminal prosecution, not civil damage awards, as the
appropriate means to punish and to express a moral judgment.6
By contrast, in the United States, civil litigation is a generally
accepted means of promoting social reform. Such "public law
litigation" focuses not on private disputes, but rather on "the
vindication of constitutional or statutory policies." 7 "The subject
matter of the lawsuit is not a dispute between private individuals
about private rights, but a grievance about the operation of public
policy." '8 Given this legal culture, the use of civil litigation as a means
of impacting human rights policies is a natural development in the
U.S. legal system.
Conclusion
As a result of these fundamentally different approaches to civil
litigation, and despite the excitement generated within the United
States by the Fildrtiga case, international interest has been minimal
until recently. But it is important to place differences in emphasis
into a larger context. In the United States, civil litigation is a
preferred means to further general international principles of
accountability. In other legal systems, the same goals are obtained
through different legal tools, including criminal cases that incorporate
claims for damages. By recognizing both the similarities and
differences of our approaches, we can coordinate the common effort
to hold responsible both individuals and corporations who violate
fundamental human rights.
46. As Professor Merryman has explained, in many legal systems:
[M]orally reprehensible... actions are matters for the criminal law rather
than for the civil law. In the civil trial, as a general rule, the plaintiffs
recovery is limited to compensation for the loss he suffered. If the judgment
of the community is going to be brought to bear on a defendant because of
the moral character of his action, it must be done through the processes of
the criminal law ....
MERRYMAN, supra note 38, at 1022.
47. Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARv. L.
REv. 1281, 1284 (1976).
48. Id. at 1302.
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